NC.1.       In the very first paragraph of Russia's Periodic Report dealing with the armed conflict in the North Caucasus (par. 36), the State describes the legal framework for the "counterterrorist operation" by referring, in addition to Federal Law No 130-FZ of 25 July 1998 “On Combating Terrorism,” to the documents of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism[1], and the Agreement of States Parties to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Concerning a Regional Counterterrorist Structure[2].

 

NC.2.       The reference to SCO documents is surprising, as this organization is guided by values which are strikingly different from those of the UN and European systems; for SCO the interests of the states prevail over human rights - which are declared to be part of the state’s internal affairs. What we see here is an obvious conflict between the two legal concepts regulating the use of force by the state and human rights restrictions.  However, upon a closer look at the situation, we see that the Russian Government is right in referring to SCO agreements, as its actions in the armed conflict zone were consistently incompatible with the international human rights conventions.

 

NC.3.       Starting from the early days of the Second Chechen War, the Russian Government has denied an armed conflict in the North Caucasus, thus preventing the application of the international humanitarian law. As a result, Additional Protocol II of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions was intentionally not applied to protect the local population.

 

NC.4.       The Federal Law against Terrorism contravenes the Convention by containing no ban on the use of torture. Moreover, art. 21 of the said Law relieves government agents of responsibility for causing harm to citizens. The Law fails to provide any legal remedies to the public nor any guarantees of fair criminal procedure. Thus, art. 24 provides for closed judicial hearings, without public access.

 

NC.5.       Russia’s report mentions that the Council of Europe reviewed the Law against Terrorism for potential conflicts with the international human rights conventions, but failed to find any. However, it is not true: in fact, the Council of Europe recommended substantial changes in the said law, but the recommendations were not honored.

 

NC.6.       Any claims that the treatment of civilians in the conflict zone was consistent with the requirements of the European Convention for Human Rights (including restrictions of freedom and integrity of the person, freedom of movement, respect for private and family life, and freedom of expression) made in par. 38 of Russia’s report are unfounded, because Russia had not followed the established derogation procedure and had not declared a state of emergency. Reference to the Law against Terrorism, originally designed for local, short-term security operations, to justify long-term (more than six years) and large scale (tens of thousands of square kilometers) restrictions of human rights is arbitrary, reflecting an excessively broad interpretation of the law. While the said law defines a counterterrorist operation as local and limited in scale, it was used to justify large-scale military operations involving powerful weapons, and random attacks in the North Caucasus.[3]

 

NC.7.       In fact, the use of the federal armed forces in the Chechen Republic is unlawful, because the Federal Law against Terrorism does not allow using the army in internal conflicts.[4] The unlawful actions of uniformed forces are the cause of persistent and massive use of torture against civilians in Chechnya.[5]

 

NC.8.       On 6 March 2006, the Russian President signed into force a new federal law – Law No 35-FZ "On Opposing Terrorism"; earlier, on 15 February, he had signed Decree No 116 “On Measures to Oppose Terrorism.” Combined, these acts grant authorities even more power to use force, restrict human rights and civil liberties, and avoid accountability.

 

 

NC.9.       Large-scale fighting in the Chechen Republic took place between autumn 1999 and March 2000, and then broad "sweep operations" continued, such as "ID checks" by combined uniformed units, including the army, internal forces, the Ministry of Interior, Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Ministry of Justice forces. They would seal off local communities to conduct blanket searches and massive, random, unlawful detentions. Detainees were then taken to “temporary filtration points” set up nearby in the armed forces' deployment area. There, detainees were usually subjected to massive beatings and cruel torture. Many cases are known where individuals “disappeared” following their detention during a “sweep operation” and transfer to a “filtration point.” Bodies of some of those “disappeared” were later on accidently found by local residents. As a rule, a few people would “disappear.” The use of force during arrest, escorting, and detention, as well as during questioning and investigation, became a modus operandi for uniformed personnel, penitentiary officers, and investigators.[6] The arrest was usually performed in an extremely brutal manner, involving the use of violence and the threat to use firearms not only against the detainee, but against all other people present, including women and children. Reasons for arrest were arbitrary – it could be ethnicity, age (ability to carry weapons), appearance or even a mark on the shoulder suspected to be left by a gun holster. Whenever locals were detained by the armed forces, primarily intelligence or spetsnaz (special purpose) units, detainees were not guaranteed even the right to life - most were killed after an “intense interrogation,” i.e. cruel torture; in many cases, saving their lives was never considered. When detainees were transported to other location, they were usually treated in extremely cruel ways to rule out any possibility of escape (such as transporting bound detainees in trucks stacked over each other, etc.).

 

NC.10.   From the first days of the conflict, torture and beatings were virtually always an integral part of investigation. It was seen as a necessity, because from the onset of the “counterterrorist operation,” the law enforcement lacked intelligence on terrorist suspects, and detainees’ confessions were usually the only evidence there was against them. It all took place against the backdrop of an active anti-Chechen campaign and a total lack of supervision over the federal forces' conduct. The armed conflict in the Chechen Republic revealed that the federal uniformed forces saw “torture” (including physical torture, cruel and degrading conditions of detention, humiliating treatment, etc.) as a necessary, normal and even desirable practice, rather than something forbidden.

 

NC.11.   With time, as federal forces were taking the Chechen territory under their control and established a network of informants, their tactics changed - they switched from deployment near local communities and blanket "sweeps" to "targeted security operations," where armed, camouflaged and masked people arrived in armored vehicles with painted-over license plates in a local community, broke into specific homes - usually at night - detained and took away some of the occupants. Being more selective did not make them less cruel -   the people they detained, or, more precisely, kidnapped, usually disappeared.

 

NC.12.   Another important recent development has been “Chechenization” of the conflict. In 2003-2005, uniformed units made of ethnic Chechens were formed in the Chechen Republic. Alongside regular police, specialized units were set up to combat rebel fighters; these units are granted the power to use unlawful force.[7]

 

NC.13.   People detained by these troops “disappear” for the rest of the world; they are kept in secret prisons without any records of their detention; they are tortured to force “confessions” underlying fabricated criminal prosecutions. In about half of the cases the kidnapped people disappeared without trace, or their dead bodies were later found.[8] Starting in 2004, threats of violence and hostage-taking against relatives have been widely used to force rebel fighters to surrender.[9]

 

 

NC.14.   Russia’s report places a major focus on the efforts by prosecutorial offices to establish the rule of law, and refers to numerous administrative measures, rules and regulations.[10] These formal efforts were designed in the first place to regulate "sweep operations." Indeed, the number of "sweeps” in residential areas has decreased significantly.  In 2004,  all sweeps were less cruel, with fewer human rights violations. However, the cruelty of certain “sweep operations” in 2005 were comparable with those of the first years of the war. An illustrative example was the operation in Borodzinovskaya, Shelkovsky District, neighboring with the Republic of Dagestan. Until recently, the local community totaled 1118, with 90% ethnic Avars.

 

NC.15.   In the south of the Republic, - a mountainous forest area - where the federal forces have failed to establish control over the territory, the fighting sometimes is similar to that in the early days of the war.

 

NC.16.   In 2005, the security operation by federal forces on 14-16 January in the mountainous village of Zumsoy, Itum-Kalinsky District and surrounding areas, was the cruelest.

 

 

NC.17.   While currently sweep operations” are rare, abductions, "disappearances” and summary executions continue. Now they take place as part or as a result of "targeted security operations" which are not subject to any legal regulation or intentionally unregulated. Attempts to reform investigation and prosecution did not result in practical improvements in terms of preventing or investigating crimes, in particular “disappearances.”

 

NC.18.   The problem of “disappearances” in Chechnya remains acute. In most cases, people who “disappear” have been kidnapped by uniformed forces, rather than rebel fighters, and recently most of the uniformed kidnappers are locals. Currently we observe a slight decrease in the number of abductions documented by human rights defenders, but this decrease is not as significant as officials claim it to be. Partially, the decrease is due to "Chechenization" of the conflict, and the high latency of violence in the Chechen territory – avoiding documentation by either human rights defenders or law enforcement authorities.[13]

 

NC.19.   Official data on the number of people who were kidnapped or "disappeared” are contradictory and incomplete. 

 

NC.20.   It is true of general statistics as well. In September 2004, during a visit of the Council of Europe Commissioner on Human Rights to Russia, the Office of the RF Prosecutor General informed him that over the past three years [apparently, since autumn 2001] in Chechnya, a total of 1,749 criminal investigations were launched into abductions of about 2,300 victims. On 13 October 2004, the acting Ombudsman in Chechnya, L. Khasuyev said that “over the last four years [apparently, since autumn 2000], more than 2,500 people have been kidnapped in the Republic.”  On 27 December 2004, A. Arsentyev, Head of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office in the Southern Federal District, said that “since the start of the anti-terrorist operation [i.e. since autumn 1999] in Chechnya, a total of 2,437 people were abducted and 347 freed by the law enforcement authorities.”  In addition, in September 2005, Chechen President A. Alkhanov said that since 2000, a total of 1898 people disappeared.[14] A month later, Head of the Chechen President’s Office for Constitutional Rights N. Nukhazhiev  announced 2500 disappearances[15]. In February 2006, the same N. Nukhazhiev reported a total of 2780 disappearances over the entire period of conflict.[16] However in early 2003, the lists of disappearances  maintained by a working group of the Chechen Government contained more than 2800 names - so it almost looks like no one disappeared in Chechnya in three years.

 

NC.21.   The current official statistics look even less convincing.

 

NC.22.   Speaking about abductions in 2004, Chechen President A. Alkhanov said, “In 2003 there were 362 abductions. This year [i.e. 2004], 175 facts were reported. … our measures resulted in 47 persons returned to their homes.”[17] Two months before, the figure of 185 abductions was quoted at the meeting of the Collegium of the Chechen Interior Ministry. Shortly before, Chechen Minister of Interior R. Alkhanov said that, “over the outgoing year 2004, abductions in Chechnya dropped by 40%.” [18] On 21 January 2005, 168 abductions in 2004 were reported to the Ministry of Interior Collegium, which was supposed to mean that abductions had dropped by half as compared to 2003, where, according to the same official, 440 people were abducted.[19]

 

NC.23.   Official statistics for 2005 and comparisons with 2004 share the same inconsistency.

 

NC.24.   In October 2005, President A. Alkhanov said that “since early [2005], a total of 143 abductions have been reported in the republic; whereas last [2004] year, 128 abductions were reported over a comparable period.” [20] Ten days later, he said that “there is a general downward trend for this type of crimes in the republic."[21] A few days later President Alkhanov clarified that in fact, only 65 people were kidnapped in Chechnya in 2005, while most of the 143 had been kidnapped before, but the crimes were officially reported in the current year.[22] In end-December he reiterated, “Abductions are on a downward trend; last year, there were 168 cases, and this year, there are 67 cases.”[23] In January, he said, “A total of 77 abductions took place this year, while there were 213 such incidents last year.”[24]

 

NC.25.   In view of these contradictory statements we are surprised that par. 98 of Russia’s report describes a “computer database created in June – September 2002 and regularly updated, with data on criminal proceedings into abductions and killings over the entire period of the anti-terrorist operation"; this database is presented as a major breakthrough in the investigation of these serious crimes.

 

NC.26.   Data available to human rights defenders on abductions and “disappearances” in Chechnya are far less optimistic - please see below a summary table for 2002 to 2005, provided by Memorial Human Rights Center.:

 

Table 5. Summary Table on Abductions in the Chechen Republic

 

NC.27.   More or less detailed data are available to Memorial to support the above statistics, including the victim’s name, surname and patronym, residence address, circumstances of abduction, etc. In total, over the “second Chechen war,” Memorial has data on about 1600 “disappearances” of people who were detained or abducted (including cases where the body was later found). Memorial monitors the situation on about 25-30% of the Chechen territory, and its data even for these areas may be incomplete. To obtain a realistic estimate, you should multiply the figures above by a factor from two to four, according to different experts.

 

NC.28.   By extrapolating Memorial’s findings and analyzing the official data, we can assume that over the entire period of “counterterrorist operation,” disappearances of people as a result of abductions, unlawful arrests and detentions were between three thousand and five thousand people. Unfortunately, we do not have more accurate numbers available to us.

 

NC.29.   As a rule, neither the prosecutor’s office, no human rights defenders succeed in identifying concrete perteprators in abduction cases. There is one single case where the kidnappers were stopped by local police and forced to show their identification documents. This happened because staff-members of the Chechen Republic brach of FSB were actually abducting people in the neighboring Ingushetia[25] and transporting them to the territory of Chechnya. The case of Adam Medov is unique, in and of itself, because it contains documental evidence of FSB’s involvement in kidnapping.

One of the most outrageous cases is the abduction and “disappearance” of Bulat Chilaev, one of the employees of the humanitarian organization “Civil Assistance”. In the morning on Aprip 9, 2006 he was abducted by the members of an unidentified armed formation on his way from the village of Sernovodsk to the Rostov-Baku intercity road. A citizen of Grozny, Aslan Israilov, was detained together with him. All attempts to free Bulat Chilaev on the side of the head of the “Civil Assistance” organization and the member of the Presidential Council on the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights – Svetlana Gannushkina – were in vain. Heads of various enforcement units of the Chechen Republic gladly agreed to help in searching for Chilaev and Israilov, but their enthusiasm evaporated quickly and mysteriously. The criminal investigation was started, and the detective officer had the evidence in his hands from the very beginning. The license plates on one of the abductors’ cars was received upon the written request of the commander of Khotin armed formation (issued on September 6, 2004), and in the place of the abduction there had been found an officer tag # F142733, which belonged to an officer from the “Zapad” unit of the 42^nd Motorized Rifle Division. However, the prosecutor’s office failed to bring this officer for interrogation for several months. When the interrogation finally took place, the officer claimed that he had lost his tag in the woods several days prior to the crime and assumed that the tag had then been deliberately left on the abduction spot by the separatists. The investigators were quite satisfied with this answer.

 

 

NC.30.   As to investigation and prosecution of crimes against civilians in the conflict zone, selective impunity prevails.

 

NC.31.   Sentences are always tough for rebel fighters, regardless of the level of their crime. Things are different concerning crimes by federal or pro-federal uniformed personnel. Official statistics are falsified. Investigations of most crimes suspected to involve uniformed forces are suspended “due to inability to identify those responsible.” Only a small proportion of cases find their way to court. Most defendants get merely symbolic sentences for major crimes.

 

NC.32.   Official sentencing statistics, again, are contradictory and apparently falsified.

 

NC.33.   In February 2003, Deputy Prosecutor General S.N.Fridinsky responded to an enquiry by MP S.A.Kovalyov by stating that “over the period of the counterterrorist operation, prosecutorial bodies in the Chechen Republic investigated 417 criminal offenses against the local population, suspected to have been committed by members of federal forces.” As of the time of enquiry, 341 of the cases (82%) were suspended "because it had been impossible to identify the culprits."

 

NC.34.   In August 2004, Prosecutor Fridinsky responded to a similar enquiry by the Federal Ombudsman that “over the period of the counterterrorist operation, prosecutorial bodies in the Chechen Republic opened 132 criminal investigations into offenses committed by members of federal forces against the local population,” and only ten investigations had been suspended at the time.

 

NC.35.   In May 2005, responding to Chair of the Presidential Council for Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights E.А.Pamfilova, RF Deputy Prosecutor General N.I.Shepel stated that “over the period of the counterterrorist operation, prosecutorial bodies in the Chechen Republic opened 143 criminal investigations into offenses suspected to have been committed by members of the federal forces.”[32]

 

NC.36.   Russia’s Report (p. 94) provides specific statistics on the number of abduction cases, which were investigated and sent to courts (“In 2003, prosecutorial investigators sent to courts for consideration on the merits 15 criminal case files on 25 episodes of abduction; 26 defendants were brought to justice over 4 months of 2004, four criminal case files were forwarded to courts, and six persons brought to justice. In total, over the period of the counter-terrorist operation, 51 criminal files were sent to courts, covering 78 episodes; a total of 84 persons were brought to justice”).

 

NC.37.   However, over the entire period of the second Chechen war only two members of the federal forces were convicted for kidnapping: Colonel Yuri Budanov and serviceman Sergey Lapin of Hanty-Mansiisky Special Task Police Force (OMON). Moreover, art. 126 of the Criminal Code (“kidnapping”) was only mentioned in the sentence of Yuri Budanov who kidnapped and then brutally killed a Chechen girl, Elsa Kungayeva. The other convict – policeman Sergey Lapin – did not have kidnapping included as part of his indictment, although he was actually convicted for kidnapping Zelimkhan Murdalov who was subjected to extreme torture in the Hanty-Mansiisky OMON deployment camp, and then “disappeared.” No other kidnapping case involved uniformed personnel as perpetrators, so the statistics quoted in the report are limited to prosecutions of civilians - local residents, participants of rebel armed units opposing the federal troops, and criminals.

 

NC.38.   Russia’s report (p. 95) also mentions the number of criminal proceedings launched by prosecutors into kidnappings and "disappearances": "Over 2004, a total of 66 prosecutions were instigated into kidnappings of 95 people; of them 36 prosecutions into kidnappings 51 persons committed this year [2004]. Over a similar period [i.e. one year, in the context of the report] of last [2003] year a total of 70 criminal proceedings were launched into the kidnappings of 116 persons. Of all people kidnapped in 2003, 70 were released. Over the four months of 2004, out of all people kidnapped, 27 were released.”

 

NC.39.   However, even by the incomplete data available to Memorial, a total of 497 people were kidnapped in 2003, 330 of them disappeared or were found dead; in 2004, a total of 448 people were kidnapped, 234 of them disappeared or were killed; moreover, in virtually all documented cases of kidnappings, disappearances and summary executions, Memorial approached prosecutorial offices with enquiries. However, criminal proceedings were only opened in less than one fourth of all abduction cases (and in less than 2/3 of "disappearances" or summary executions).

 

NC.40.   Russia’s report (p. 96) expresses a regret that “outside the focus of international organizations remain those crimes that are committed against members of law enforcement bodies, heads and staff members of administrations, local self-government, religious leaders, peaceful population, - by members of illegal armed formations (IAF). Over the period of counterterrorist operation, a total of 2,722 criminal proceedings were opened into these facts.” Undoubtedly, this number here and further on stands for the totality of criminal cases registered in the “data-base of criminal cases on abductions and killings for the entire period of the counter-terorrist operation”, which is mention in Russia’s report.

 

NC.41.   In the context of continued armed conflict in the Chechen Republic, frequent victims of armed separatists' attacks are local residents, primarily both uniformed personnel (accoriding to the monitoring findings of the “Memorial”, the number of such individuals killed in 2003 is 72; in 2004 – 105; and in 2005 - 44 persons), and administrative officials (according to the “Memorial”, in 2003 – one such individual was killed; in 2004 – seven; in 2005 – eight persons).

 

NC.42.   Thus, it is evident that most of the 2,722 criminal investigations mentioned in Russia’s report were launched into crimes against “peaceful population” - i.e. Chechen residents who were not part of uniformed forces or administrative bodies. Russia’s Report says that 2,105 of the cases have been suspended, because it has been impossible to identify suspects to prosecute. If this is the case, it is unclear why the authors of the official report are convinced that the crimes were committed by rebel fighters. The majority of these prosecutions are under art. 126 of the Criminal Code (“abduction”). Notably, in most cases of abduction, were human rights defenders were able to interview witnesses and clarify the circumstances, both the circumstances and the witnesses pointed to involvement of federal forces or other uniformed forces under their control (the use of armored vehicles, unhindered transit through checkpoints, etc.).

 

NC.43.   Prosecutorial statistics are obviously incomplete. Recently, prosecutors have increasingly responded to Memorial’s enquiries about kidnapped people by stating that “the facts have not been confirmed.” It usually happens when relatives succeed in buying out the kidnapped person from uniformed personnel: neither the victim, nor the relatives complain in such cases, or withdraw the complaint if it has been filed. Notably, recently police and prosecutors have often discouraged relatives from filing complaints; they usually say that complaining may worsen the fate of the victim and lower chances of his release through informal arrangements.

 

NC.44.   Even in the 188 out of the 2,722 cases, where, according to Russia’s report, charges were brought against specific Chechens, with subsequent convictions and sentencing, very often we have reasons to doubt the findings of preliminary and judicial investigations. For example, prosecutors reported successful investigation of the killing, in the night of 29 to 30 November 2002, of Malika Umazheva, former head of administration in Alkhan Kala; members of an IAF were convicted and sentenced for the crime. However, according to Umazheva’s relatives, federal servicemen arriving in an APC took her out of the house into the courtyard and killed her there. At the same time, four more APCs were cruising the village. Notably, rebel fighters do not have armored vehicles.

 

NC.45.   Russia has a dual system of criminal investigation: military prosecutors investigate crimes committed by servicemen under the command of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior Internal Forces, and the FSB. Crimes committed by civilians or the Ministry of Interior staff (other than Internal Forces)  are investigated by local prosecutorial offices, which are not allowed to investigate crimes by the military. Whenever a local prosecutorial office forwards a criminal case file to a military prosecutor’s office, the latter can refuse to accept it and to follow through with the proceedings, without giving any reasons for such refusal. So most cases where investigations were closed or suspended “due to impossibility to identify the suspects” remain the responsibility of local (civilian) prosecutors who are not allowed, by definition, to investigate such cases properly.

 

NC.46.   The meetings, orders, directives and instructions listed in paras 100-104 of Russia’s Report, including Joint directive by the Chechen Prosecutor’s Office and the UGF Military Prosecutor’s Office No 15 of 30 November 2002 “On setting up joint investigative teams” so far have failed to make any difference.

 

NC.47.   Over the entire period of the “second Chechen war” 103 servicemen faced trial for crimes against Chechen civilians as of mid-2005. [33] Eight of them were found not guilty. Thus, for example, the court acquitted four servicemen of GRU Spetsnaz (Captain Ulman and others) prosecuted for shooting detainees - peaceful civilians. With regard to three defendants, the court dropped the case due to decriminalization of the act in question. Twenty more servicemen were amnestied, - including for example, a contract serviceman who opened fire out of pure malice, killing a woman and wounding another one. 27 servicemen, most of whom committed murders of peaceful civilians while off-duty, were sentenced to various prison terms, ranging between one year of settlement colony to 18 years of strict regime prison. The absolute majority, however, received purely symbolic penalties, such as probation (including perpetrators of rape, robbery, extortion, torture of unlawfully detained civilians, theft, deliberate destruction of property, etc.), fines (for beating, unlawful detention of prosecutorial staff, etc.), and internal disciplinary sanctions.

 

NC.48.   As of mid-2005, a total of 34 police officers were convicted for crimes against civilians. Just as the army personnel, most police officers were sentenced to "symbolic" punishments. Only seven received real prison terms, others (including those guilty of drunk shooting and killing or wounding innocent people; extortion, bribes, threats of murder, “hooliganism,” etc.) were sentenced to probation.

 

NC.49.   Proceedings are still underway in a high-profile case of massive killings by federal servicemen of peaceful civilians in Staropromyslovsky District of Grozny, in Alkhan-Yurt, and in Novye Aldy. There have been no effective criminal investigations in any of the found massive burial sites.

 

NC.50.   The law enforcement officers seem to harbor no misconceptions as to who abducts people. Thus, the “Analysis of the Current Status of Operational Environment in Relation to People Abductions on the Territory of Oktyabrsky District of the City of Grozny from 1995 to September 2006” (see Annex for quotes) says that 9 people were abducted by the criminal groups, 58 – by the officers of Oktyabrsky temporary department of internal affairs, and 15 – by other military formations.

 

 

 

NC.51.   Attempts to overcome the "selective impunity" by judicial remedies have been frustrated in most cases. We will quote an example of criminal investigation into the abduction of two Chechen residents.

 

NC.52.   The ineffectiveness of Russia’s judicial system is manifested in particular in its inability to put an end to the impunity of uniformed personnel committing crimes against civilians. A dramatic example of such failure of the Russian judiciary is the high-profile Ulman case mentioned in the sub-section on Impunity of Federal and Local Uniformed Personnel in this section of the report. Four members of the special-task force of the Russian Military Intelligence (GRU), including Captain Eduard Ulman, Captain Alexander Kalagansky, Ensign Vladimir Voyevodin and Major Alexey Perelevsky are charged with murder of six Chechen civilians on 11 January 2002 in the village of Dai, Shatoy district of Chechnya. Two jury trials have acquitted them. However, Ulman, Kalagansky and Voyevodin do not deny killing the civilians, but argue that they had followed Perelevsky’s orders. Perelevsky confirms that he gave that order and they’re witnesses to that event. However, Perelevsky, in turn, claims that the order was initially radioed to him but a higher-in-command in charge of that special operation, Colonel Plotnikov. Plotnikov, on the other hand, denies this allegation and there is no evidence to prove that the order did come from him.

 

 

 

 

NC.53.   Courts, which formally resumed their functions in the Chechen Republic in early 2001, were not adequately staffed until 2004.  But even today, the investigative and judicial systems are unable to ensure access to justice, because courts are not independent, and are often involved in falsifying criminal prosecutions. In turn, prosecutorial bodies with their dual functions of investigating crimes and supervising over investigations are not willing to investigate and expose false prosecutions due to the conflict of interests.

 

NC.54.   In 2004-2005, many victims of kidnapping did not disappear without trace, but were later found in lawful or quasi-lawful detention centers and subjected to falsified prosecution. Here is a common pattern that we have identified. A person suspected of involvement in IAF is unlawfully detained by uniformed personnel who fail to identify themselves, to notify the detainee of the reasons for arrest or where they are going. The detainee's relatives do not know whether the person has been taken by servicemen or bandits, and where they are taken. The detainee usually “disappears” for a while, up to a few days. During this time, those responsible for his detention try to force a confession, usually by subjecting him to cruel beatings and torture.

 

NC.55.   A defense lawyer appointed by the investigator fails to complain about torture being used against the suspect, to demand medical assistance or forensic assessment of the detainee’s health. During this time, the detainee’s relatives do not yet know his whereabouts and cannot hire another defense lawyer for him. The detainee is subjected to torture to force a confession of any crime he is suspected of, plus any other undetected crimes, and to get him to disclose anyone he knows to be involved in illegal activity - or to give false testimony against any other suspect. There is evidence that in addition to beatings and torture, psychological pressure is used against the detainee or his relatives, such as threats of sexual violence against the detainee, his wife, other family members, - and such threats are often a strong factor forcing the detainee's "confession." In the atmosphere of physical violence and psychological pressure, the suspect is told that it is better for him to “cooperate” with the investigator and sign everything they are told to sign, so that later the investigator will try to “help” him and make things better for him when the case goes to court.

 

NC.56.   Confessions are usually signed in the presence of the investigator, and then confirmed in the presence of lawyers. Then torture is no longer used, but the suspect is warned in advance that should he deny his testimony later, he will be subjected to even stronger pressure. These threats are usually fulfilled immediately should a suspect deny his testimony at the preliminary investigation stage. Suspects are instructed in details of their made-up crimes, with a special focus on what exactly they should do during investigative actions. Usually, a lawyer hired by the family is given access to the suspect after the latter has signed his “confession.” Even thought the lawyer may know about the illegal methods used against the defendant, he does not usually challenge them, fearing for his/her own safety. The defendant’s confession of a crime he is charged with becomes the sole evidence of his guilt.

 

NC.57.   Even in cases where the use of violence against the defendant was raised in court, the judge was usually unable to detect the falsification, give an adequate legal assessment of the procedural violations, and pass a fair verdict. It is extremely difficult to document torture in pre-trial detention. This system leaves little chance for fair punishment of the guilty and acquittal of the innocent. Complaints to federal supervisory authorities are usually sent back to local supervisory authorities that cover up the abuse committed by law enforcement and security agencies.

 

NC.58.   Thus, Mehti Mukhayev, born in 1958, resident of the mountainous village of Zumsoy, Itum-Kalinsky District of Chechnya, whose family applied to the European Court of Human Rights, was unlawfully detained and tortured for the purpose of falsified prosecution against him.